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Abstract
Adversarial training is currently the most powerful defense against adversarial examples.
Previous empirical results suggest that adversarial training requires wider networks for better
performances. Yet, it remains elusive how does neural network width affects model robustness.
In this paper, we carefully examine the relation between network width and model robustness.
We present an intriguing phenomenon that the increased network width may not help robustness.
Specifically, we show that the model robustness is closely related to both natural accuracy and
perturbation stability, a new metric proposed in our paper to characterize the model’s stability
under adversarial perturbations. While better natural accuracy can be achieved on wider neural
networks, the perturbation stability actually becomes worse, leading to a potentially worse
overall model robustness. To understand the origin of this phenomenon, we further relate the
perturbation stability with the network’s local Lipschitznesss. By leveraging recent results on
neural tangent kernels, we show that larger network width naturally leads to worse perturbation
stability. This suggests that to fully unleash the power of wide model architecture, practitioners
should adopt a larger regularization parameter for training wider networks. Experiments on
benchmark datasets confirm that this strategy could indeed alleviate the perturbation stability
issue and improve the state-of-the-art robust models.
1 Introduction
Researchers have found that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) suffer badly from adversarial examples
(Szegedy et al., 2014). By perturbing the original inputs with an intentionally computed, undetectable
noise, one can deceive DNNs and even arbitrarily modify their predictions on purpose. To defend
against adversarial examples and further improve model robustness, various defense approaches
have been proposed (Papernot et al., 2016b; Meng and Chen, 2017; Dhillon et al., 2018; Liao et al.,
2018; Xie et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018). Among them,
adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018) has been shown to be the most
effective type of defenses (Athalye et al., 2018). Adversarial training can be seen as a form of data
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Figure 1: Plots of both natural risk and robust regularization in (1.1). Models are trained using
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) on CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) with 34-layer WideResNet
model (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016) with widen factor of 1 and 10.
augmentation by first finding the adversarial examples and then training DNN models on those
examples. Specifically, given a DNN classifier f parameterized by θ, a general form of adversarial
training with loss function L can be defined as:
argmin
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
L(θ;xi, yi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural risk
+λ · max
x̂i∈B(xi,)
[L(θ; x̂i, yi)− L(θ;xi, yi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
robust regularization
]
, (1.1)
where {(xi, yi)ni=1} are training data, B(x, ) = {x̂ | ‖x̂− x‖p ≤ } denotes the `p norm ball with
radius  centered at x, and p ≥ 1, and λ > 0 is the regularization parameter. Compared with
standard empirical risk minimization, the extra robust regularization term encourages the data
points within B(x, ) to be classified as the same class. The regularization parameter λ adjusts the
strength of robust regularization. When λ = 1, it recovers the formulation in Madry et al. (2018),
and when λ = 0.5, it recovers the formulation in Goodfellow et al. (2015). Furthermore, replacing
the loss difference in robust regularization term with the KL-divergence based regularization recovers
the formulation in Zhang et al. (2019).
One common belief in the practice of adversarial training is that, compared with the standard
empirical risk minimization, adversarial training requires much wider neural networks to achieve
better robustness. Madry et al. (2018) provided an intuitive explanation: robust classification
requires a much more complicated decision boundary, as it needs to handle the presence of possible
adversarial examples. Yet it remains elusive how does the network width affects the model robustness.
To answer this question, we first examine whether the larger network width contributes to both the
natural risk term and the robust regularization term in (1.1). Interestingly, when tracing the value
changes in (1.1) during adversarial training, we observe that the value of the robust regularization
part actually gets worse on wider models, suggesting that larger network width does not lead to
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better stability. In Figure 1, we show the loss value comparison of two different wide models trained
using Zhang et al. (2019). We can see that the wider model (i.e., WideResNet-34-10) achieves better
natural risk but incurs a larger value on robust regularization. This motivates us to find out the
cause of this phenomenon.
In this paper, we carefully study the relationship between neural network width and model
robustness with a counter-intuitive conclusion that the increased network width may not help
robustness. We summarize our main contributions as
1. We show that the model robustness is closely related to both natural accuracy and perturbation
stability, a new metric we proposed to characterize the strength of robust regularization. While
the natural accuracy is improved on wider models, the perturbation stability often gets worse.
This suggests that the deteriorated perturbation stability is the main reason for the marginal
improved or even degenerate model robustness on wider models.
2. Unlike previous understandings that there exists a trade-off between natural accuracy and
robust accuracy, we show that the real trade-off should between natural accuracy and pertur-
bation stability. And the robust accuracy is actually the consequence of this trade-off.
3. To understand the origin of this problem, we further relate perturbation stability with the
network’s local Lipschitznesss. By leveraging recent results on neural tangent kernels (Jacot
et al., 2018; Allen-Zhu et al., 2019; Zou et al., 2020; Cao and Gu, 2019; Gao et al., 2019), we
show that larger network width naturally leads to worse perturbation stability, which explains
our empirical findings.
4. Our analyses suggest that to fully unleash the potential of wider model architectures, one
should mitigate the perturbation stability deterioration on wider models. One natural strategy
is to enlarge the corresponding robust regularization parameter. We experimentally verified
this strategy with adversarial training methods on benchmark datasets and found that it
clearly boosts the robustness of wider models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly review existing
literature on adversarial attacks and defenses as well as robustness and generalization. We empirically
study the network width and adversarial robustness for adversarial training methods in Section 3.
In Section 4, we theoretically show that larger network width leads to worse perturbation stability.
In Section 5, we show that improving the perturbation stability on wide models leads to better
robustness on benchmark datasets. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
Notation. For a d-dimensional vector x = [x1, ..., xd]
>, we use ‖x‖p = (
∑d
i=1 |xi|p)1/p with p ≥ 1 to
denote its `p norm. 1(·) represents the indicator function and ∀ represents the universal quantifier.
2 Related work
There is a huge body of literature on adversarial machine learning. Here we briefly review represen-
tative works that are mostly related to our paper.
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Adversarial attacks. Adversarial examples and their intriguing properties were first found in
Szegedy et al. (2014). Since then, a tremendous amount of works have been done exploring the
origins or inevitability of this intriguing property of deep learning (Gu and Rigazio, 2015; Kurakin
et al., 2017; Fawzi et al., 2018; Trame`r et al., 2017; Gilmer et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020b) as well as
designing more powerful attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016a; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Chen and Gu, 2020) under various attack
settings. Athalye et al. (2018) identified the gradient masking problem and showed that many
defense methods could be broken with a few changes on the attacker. Chen et al. (2017) proposed
gradient-free black-box attacks and Ilyas et al. (2018, 2019a); Chen et al. (2020) further improved
its efficiency. Recently, Ilyas et al. (2019b); Jacobsen et al. (2019) pointed out adversarial examples
are generated from the non-robust or invariant features hidden in the training data.
Defensive adversarial learning. Many defense approaches have been proposed aiming to
directly learn a robust model that is able to defend against adversarial attacks. Madry et al. (2018)
proposed a general framework of robust training by solving a min-max optimization problem. Wang
et al. (2019) proposed a new criterion to quantitatively evaluate the convergence quality. Zhang
et al. (2019) theoretically studied the trade-off between natural accuracy and robust accuracy for
adversarially trained models. Wang et al. (2020) followed this framework and further improved its
robustness by differentiating correctly classified and misclassified examples. Cisse´ et al. (2017); Ross
and Doshi-Velez (2018) solve the problem by restricting the variation of outputs with respect to
the changing of inputs. Cohen et al. (2019); Salman et al. (2019); Le´cuyer et al. (2019) developed
provably robust adversarial learning methods that have the theoretical guarantees on robustness.
Recent works in Wong et al. (2020); Qin et al. (2019) focus on creating adversarial robust networks
with faster training protocol. Another line of works focuses on increasing the effective size of the
training data, either by pre-trained models (Hendrycks et al., 2019) or by semi-supervised learning
methods (Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019; Najafi et al., 2019).
Robustness and generalization. Earlier works like Goodfellow et al. (2015) found that adver-
sarial learning can reduce overfitting and help generalization. However, as the arm race between
attackers and defenses keeps going, it is observed that strong adversarial attacks can cause severe
damage to the model’s natural accuracy (Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019). Many works (Zhang
et al., 2019; Tsipras et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2019) attempt to explain this trade-off between
robustness and natural generalization, while some other works proposed different perspectives.
Schmidt et al. (2018) confirmed that more training data has the potential to close this gap. Bubeck
et al. (2019) suggested that a robust model is computationally difficult to learn and optimize. Zhang
et al. (2020b) showed that there is still a large gap between the currently achieved model robustness
and the theoretically achievable robustness limit on real image distributions. In Nakkiran (2019), the
existence of robust models with high natural accuracy has been proved in the setting of classification.
However, the origin of this trade-off is not crystal clear, and its relation with the model complexity
remains elusive.
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3 Empirical study on network width and adversarial robustness
In this section, we empirically study the relation between network width and its adversarial robustness
in a more thorough way.
3.1 Characterization of robust examples
Robust accuracy is the standard evaluation metric of robustness, which measures the ratio of
robust examples, i.e., examples that can still be correctly classified after adversarial attacks.
Robust
Examples
Stable
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Correctly
Classified
Examples
All Samples
Figure 2: An illustration of the robust exam-
ples.
Previous empirical results suggest that wide models
enjoy both better generalization ability and model
robustness. Specifically, Madry et al. (2018) pro-
posed to extend ResNet (He et al., 2016) architecture
to WideResNet (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016)
with a widen factor 10 for adversarial training on
the CIFAR10 dataset and found that the increased
model capacity significantly improves both robust
accuracy and natural accuracy. Later works such as
(Zhang et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020) follow this
finding and report their best result using WideRes-
Net (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016) with widen
factor 10.
However, as shown by our findings in Figure 1,
wider models actually lead to worse robust regular-
ization effect, suggesting that wider models are not
better in all aspects and the relation between model robustness and network width may be more
intricate than what people understood previously. To understand the intrinsic relation between
model robustness and network width, let us first take a closer look at the robust examples. Math-
ematically, robust examples can be defined as Srob :=
{
x : ∀x̂ ∈ B(x, ), f(θ; x̂) = y}, which are
examples that can still be correctly classified after adversarial attacks. Note that a robust example
should meet the following two conditions at the same time:{
x : ∀x̂ ∈ B(x, ), f(θ; x̂) = y}︸ ︷︷ ︸
robust examples:Srob
=
{
x : f(θ;x) = y
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
correctly classified examples:Scorrect
∧{x : ∀x̂ ∈ B(x, ), f(θ;x) = f(θ; x̂)},︸ ︷︷ ︸
stable examples:Sstable
(3.1)
where ∧ is the logical conjunction operator. By (3.1), we notice that the robust examples are the
intersection of two other sets: correctly classified examples and stable examples. A more direct
illustration of this relationship can be found in Figure 2. While natural accuracy measures the
ratio of correctly classified examples |Scorrect| against the whole sample set, to our knowledge, there
does not exist a metric measuring the ratio of stable examples |Sstable| against whole the sample
set. Here we formally define this as perturbation stability, which measures the fraction of examples
whose output labels cannot be adversarially perturbed as reflected in the robust regularization term
in (1.1).
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3.2 Evaluation of perturbation stability
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Figure 3: Plots of (a) robust accuracy, (b) natural accuracy, and (c) perturbation stability against
training epochs for networks of different width. Results are acquired on CIFAR10 with the adversarial
training method TRADES and architectures of WideResNet-34. Training schedule is the same as
the original work (Zhang et al., 2019). We record all three metrics when robust accuracy reaches
the highest point and plot them against network width in (d).
We apply the state-of-the-art adversarial training algorithm TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) on
CIFAR10 and plot the robust accuracy, natural accuracy, and perturbation stability against the
training epochs in Figure 3. Experiments are conducted on WideResNet-34 with various widen
factors. For each network, when robust accuracy reaches the highest point, we record all three
metrics and show their changing trend against network width in Figure 3(d). From Figure 3(d), we
can observe that the perturbation stability decreases monotonically as the network width increases.
This suggests that wider models are actually more vulnerable to adversarial perturbation. In this
sense, the increased network width could hurt the overall model robustness to a certain extent. This
can be seen from Figure 3(d), where the robust accuracy of widen-factor 5 is actually slightly better
than that of widen-factor 10.
Aside from the relation with model width, we also gain some other insights from the newly
proposed perturbation stability:
1. Unlike robust accuracy and natural accuracy, perturbation stability gradually gets worse
during the training process. This makes sense since an unlearned model that always outputs
the same label will have perfect stability, and the training process tends to break this perfect
stability. From another perspective, the role of robust regularization in (1.1) is to encourage
perturbation stability, such that the learned models cannot be easily perturbed for the sake of
model robustness.
2. Previous works (Zhang et al., 2019; Tsipras et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2019) have argued
that there exists a trade-off between natural accuracy and robust accuracy. However, from
(3.1), we can see that robust accuracy and natural accuracy are coupled with each other, as a
robust example must first be correctly classified. When the natural accuracy goes to zero, the
robust accuracy will become zero. On the other hand, higher natural accuracy also implies
that more examples will likely become robust examples. Therefore, we argue that the real
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trade-off here should be between natural accuracy and perturbation stability. And the robust
accuracy is actually the consequence of this trade-off.
3. Rice et al. (2020) has recently shown that adversarial training suffers from over-fitting as the
robust accuracy might get worse as training proceeds, which can be seen in Figure 3(a). We
found that the origin of this over-fitting is largely attributed to the degenerate perturbation
stability (See Figure 3(c)) rather than the natural risk (See Figure 3(b)).
4 Why larger network width leads to worse perturbation stabil-
ity?
Our empirical findings in Section 3 motivates us to find the underlying reason for the decrease of
the perturbation stability during the training process. In this section, we show in theory that larger
network width naturally leads to worse perturbation stability by relating perturbation stability with
the network’s local Lipchitzness and leveraging recent studies on neural tangent kernels (Jacot et al.,
2018; Allen-Zhu et al., 2019; Cao and Gu, 2019; Zou et al., 2020; Gao et al., 2019) to illustrate it.
4.1 Perturbation stability and local Lipschitzness
Previous works (Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017; Weng et al., 2018) usually relate local Lipschitzness
with network robustness, suggesting that smaller local Lipschitzness leads to robust models. Here
we show that local Lipshctzness is more directly linked to perturbation stability, through which it
further influences model robustness.
To get started, let us first recall the definition of Lipschitz continuity and its relation with
gradient norms.
Lemma 4.1 (Lipschitz continuity and gradient norm (Paulavicˇius and Zˇilinskas, 2006)). Let D ∈ Rd
denotes a convex compact set, f is a Lipschitz function if for all x,x′ ∈ D, it satisfies
|f(x′)− f(x)| ≤ L‖x′ − x‖p,
where L = supx∈D{‖∇f(x)‖q} and 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
Intuitively speaking, Lipschitz continuity guarantees that small perturbation in the input will
not lead to large changes in the function output. In the adversarial training setting where the
perturbation x′ can only be chosen within the neighborhood of x, we focus on the local Lipschitz
constant where we restrict x′ ∈ B(x, ) and L = supx′∈B(x,){‖∇f(x′)‖q}.
Now suppose our neural network loss function is local Lipschitz, setting x′ as our computed
adversarial example x̂ and x as the original example, we have
L(θ; x̂, y)− L(θ;x, y) = |L(θ; x̂, y)− L(θ;x, y)|
≤ L‖x̂− x‖p
≤ L, (4.1)
where the equality holds since x̂ is the maximizer of the robust regularization term, the first
inequality is due to local Lipschitz continuity and L = supx′∈B(x,){‖∇L(θ;x′, y)‖q}. (4.1) shows
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that the local Lipschitz constant is directly related to the robust regularization term, which can be
used as a surrogate loss for the perturbation stability.
4.2 Local Lipschitzness and network width
Now we study how the network width affects the perturbation stability via studying the local
Lipschitz constant.
Recently, a line of research emerges, which tries to theoretically understand the optimization
and generalization behaviors of over-parameterized deep neural networks through the lens of the
neural tangent kernel (NTK) (Jacot et al., 2018; Allen-Zhu et al., 2019; Cao and Gu, 2019; Zou
et al., 2020). By showing the equivalence between over-parameterized neural networks and NTK
in the finite width setting, this type of analysis characterizes the optimization and generalization
performance of deep learning by the network architecture (e.g., network width, which we are
particularly interested in). Recently, Gao et al. (2019) also analyzed the convergence of adversarial
training for over-parameterized neural networks using NTK. Here, we will show that the local
Lipschitz constant increases as the model width.
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Figure 4: Plot of approximated local Lips-
chitz constant along the adversarial training
trajectory. Models are trained by TRADES
(Zhang et al., 2019) on CIFAR10 dataset us-
ing WideResNet model. Wider networks in
general have larger local Lipschitz constants.
In specific, let m be the network width and H
be the network depth. Define an H-layer fully con-
nected neural network as follows
f(x) = a>σ(W(H)σ(W(H−1) · · ·σ(W(1)x) · · · )),
where W(1) ∈ Rm×d, W(h) ∈ Rm×m, h = 2, . . . ,H
are the weight matrices, a ∈ Rm is the output layer
weight vector, and σ(·) is the entry-wise ReLU acti-
vation function. For notational simplicity, we denote
by W = {W(H), . . . ,W(1)} the collection of weight
matrices and by W0 = {W(H)0 , . . . ,W(1)0 } the col-
lection of initial weight matrices. Following Gao
et al. (2019), we assume the first layer and the last
layer’s weights are fixed, and W is updated via pro-
jected gradient descent with projection set B(R) =
{W : ‖W(h) −W(h)0 ‖F ≤ R/
√
m,h = 1, 2, . . . ,H}.
We have the following lemma upper bounding the
input gradient norm.
Lemma 4.2. For any given input x ∈ Rd and `2
norm perturbation limit , if m ≥ max(d,Ω(H log(H))), R/√m +  ≤ c/(H6(logm)3) for some
sufficient small c > 0, then with probability at least 1−O(H)e−Ω(m(R/
√
m+)2/3H), we have for any
x′ ∈ B(x, ) and Lipschitz loss L, the input gradient norm satisfies
‖∇L(f(x′), y)‖2 = O
(√
mH
)
.
The proof of Lemma 4.2 can be found in the supplemental materials. Note that Lemma 4.2
holds for any x′ ∈ B(x, ), therefore, the maximum input gradient norm in the -ball is also in the
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order of O(
√
mH). Lemma 4.2 suggests that the local Lipschitz constant is closely related to the
neural network width m. In particular, the local Lipschitz constant scales as the square root of
the network width. This in theory explains why wider networks are more vulnerable to adversarial
perturbation.
In order to further verify the above theoretical result, we empirically calculate the local Lip-
schitz constant. In detail, for commonly used `∞ norm threat model, we evaluate the quantity
supx′∈B(x,){‖∇L(θ;x′, y)‖1} along the adversarial training trajectory for networks with different
widths. Note that solving this maximization problem along the entire training trajectory is compu-
tationally expensive or even intractable. Therefore, we approximate this quantity by choosing the
maximum input gradient `1-norm among the 10 attack steps for each iteration. We plot this result
in Figure 4 and we can see that larger network width indeed leads to larger local Lipschitz constant
values. This backup the theoretical results in Lemma 4.2.
Table 1: The three metrics under PGD20×0.007 attack with different λ on CIFAR10 dataset using
WideResNet-34 model.
Robust Accuracy (%) Natural Accuracy (%) Perturbation Stability (%)
λ width-1 width-5 width-10 width-1 width-5 width-10 width-1 width-5 width-10
6 47.70 55.88 57.19 75.43 84.45 86.52 70.01 69.84 69.18
9 47.69 56.33 57.55 72.99 82.24 84.79 72.44 71.58 70.99
12 47.67 56.38 57.54 71.38 81.23 83.68 74.09 73.39 71.97
15 47.30 56.14 57.68 70.29 80.41 83.01 74.79 73.96 72.78
18 46.80 55.97 57.77 69.27 79.19 82.11 75.43 74.99 73.71
21 46.19 55.88 58.11 67.76 78.15 81.15 76.24 75.86 75.27
5 Experiments
From Section 4, we know that wider networks have worse perturbation stability. This suggests
that to fully unleash the potential of wide model architectures, we need to instead improve the
perturbation stability of wide models. One natural strategy to do this is by adopting a larger
robust regularization parameter λ in (1.1). In this section, we conduct thorough experiments to see
whether this strategy can mitigate the negative effects on perturbation stability and achieve better
performances for wider networks.
5.1 Experimental settings
We conduct our experiments on CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) dataset, which is the most
popular dataset in the adversarial training literature. It contains images from 10 different categories,
with 50k images for training and 10k for testing. Note that standard adversarial training does not
include the λ parameter. Here we conduct our experiments using TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019).
Networks are chosen from WideResNet (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016) with different widen
9
Table 2: Robust accuracy (%) for different datasets, architectures and regularization parameters
under various attacks.
Dataset Architecture
widen-factor/
growing-rate
regulari-
zation
PGD
(20× 0.003)
PGD
(20× 0.007)
C&W
(20× 0.007)
PGD
(100× 0.007)
CIFAR10
WideResNet-34
w = 1
λ = 6 48.72 47.70 44.32 47.79
λ = 12 48.36 47.67 43.90 47.60
λ = 21 47.11 46.19 42.84 46.59
w = 5
λ = 6 57.20 55.88 54.04 55.76
λ = 12 57.39 56.38 54.15 56.28
λ = 21 56.62 55.88 53.11 55.78
w = 10
λ = 6 58.84 57.19 55.42 56.96
λ = 12 59.01 57.54 55.53 57.70
λ = 21 59.13 58.11 55.81 57.96
DenseNet-BC-40
k = 12
λ = 6 45.40 44.49 41.33 44.60
λ = 12 44.29 43.52 40.11 43.70
λ = 21 43.40 42.08 38.81 43.01
k = 40
λ = 6 54.42 53.11 49.83 52.61
λ = 12 53.38 52.86 50.12 52.72
λ = 21 52.19 51.03 48.18 51.60
k = 80
λ = 6 56.17 54.91 52.30 55.07
λ = 12 56.22 55.09 52.63 55.31
λ = 21 55.12 54.56 51.87 54.46
CIFAR100
WideResNet-34
w = 1
λ = 6 24.04 24.06 24.47 23.95
λ = 12 23.99 23.89 24.46 23.91
λ = 21 22.99 22.84 23.32 23.02
w = 5
λ = 6 31.38 30.60 27.32 30.88
λ = 12 33.20 32.78 28.88 32.69
λ = 21 33.15 32.35 28.51 32.68
w = 10
λ = 6 32.34 31.67 28.82 31.75
λ = 12 34.31 33.74 30.17 33.63
λ = 21 34.53 34.18 30.22 34.04
DenseNet-BC-40
k = 12
λ = 6 22.52 22.24 18.38 22.12
λ = 12 22.41 22.10 17.96 22.11
λ = 21 22.05 21.78 17.46 21.80
k = 40
λ = 6 29.10 28.63 24.27 28.57
λ = 12 29.61 29.28 24.54 29.26
λ = 21 29.21 28.89 24.41 28.76
k = 80
λ = 6 31.61 31.18 26.99 31.11
λ = 12 32.79 32.31 27.30 32.26
λ = 21 32.80 32.36 27.40 32.29
factor from 1, 5, 10. The batch size is set to 64, and we train each model for 100 epochs. The initial
learning rate is set to be 0.1 by default. We adopt a slightly different learning rate decay schedule:
instead of dividing the learning rate by 10 after 75-th epoch and 90-th epoch in Madry et al. (2018);
Zhang et al. (2019); Wang et al. (2020), we halve the learning rate for every epoch after the 75-th
epoch, for the purpose of obtaining better perturbation stability.
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Table 3: Robust accuracy (%) comparison on CIFAR10 under AutoAttack. † represents models
trained with the support of unlabeled data.
Methods  AutoAttack
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) 0.031 53.08
Ours(TRADES/WideResNet-34-10/λ = 21) 0.031 54.73
Ours (RST/WideResNet-34-15/λ = 24)† 0.031 60.34
Early-Stop (Rice et al., 2020) 8/255 53.42
FAT (Zhang et al., 2020a) 8/255 53.51
HE (Pang et al., 2020) 8/255 53.74
Ours(TRADES/WideResNet-34-10/λ = 21) 8/255 54.28
MART (Wang et al., 2020)† 8/255 56.29
HYDRA (Sehwag et al., 2020)† 8/255 57.14
RST (Carmon et al., 2019)† 8/255 59.53
Ours (RST/WideResNet-34-15/λ = 24/)† 8/255 59.78
For evaluating the model robustness, we perform the standard white-box PGD attack (Madry
et al., 2018) using 20 steps with step size 0.007, and  = 8/255. Note that previous works (Zhang
et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020) report their results using 20-step PGD attack with step size 0.003,
which we found is less effective and may not reveal the true robustness of the trained networks.
5.2 Model robustness with larger robust regularization parameter
We first compare the robustness performance of models with different network width using robust
regularization parameter chosen from {6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21} for TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019). Results
of different evaluation metrics are presented in Table 1, including the robust accuracy, natural
accuracy, and perturbation stability.
From Table 1, we can observe that the best robust accuracy for width-1 network is achieved
when λ = 6, yet for width-5 network, the best robust accuracy is achieved when λ = 12, and for
width-10 network, the best λ is 21. This suggests that wider networks indeed need a larger robust
regularization parameter to fully unleash the power of wide model architecture. It is worth noting
that enlarging λ indeed leads to improved perturbation stability. Under the same λ, wider networks
have worse perturbation stability. This observation is rather consistent with our empirical and
theoretical findings in Sections 3 and 4.
5.3 Experiments on different datasets and architectures
To show that our theory is universal and is applicable to various datasets and architectures, we
conduct extra experiments on the CIFAR100 dataset and DenseNet model (Huang et al., 2017).
Note that adversarial training is computationally very expensive, and it is not scalable to large
datasets like ImageNet so far. For the DenseNet models, the growing rate k denotes how fast the
number of channels grows and thus becomes a suitable measure of network width. Following the
original paper (Huang et al., 2017), we choose DenseNet-BC with depth equals to 40 and use models
with different growing rates to verify our theory.
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Experimental results are shown in Table 2. For completeness, we also report the results under
different attack methods and settings, including the C&W (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) attack, the
standard PGD attack with 20 steps of step size 0.003 used in Madry et al. (2018); Zhang et al. (2019),
and more time-consuming but powerful 100-steps PGD attack. We adopt the best regularization
parameters λ from Table 1 and show the corresponding performance on models with different width.
It can be seen that our strategy of using a larger robust regularization parameter works very well
across different datasets and networks. On the WideResNet model, we observe clear patterns as in
Section 5.2. On the DenseNet model, although the best regularization λ is different from that of
WideResNet, wider models, in general, still require larger robust regularization for better robustness.
5.4 Comparison of robustness on wide models
Previous experiments in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 have shown the effectiveness of our proposed
strategy on using larger robust regularization parameter for wider models. In order to ensure that
this strategy does not lead to any obfuscated gradient problem (Athalye et al., 2018) and gives a
false sense of robustness, we further conduct experiments using stronger attacks. In particular, we
choose to evaluate our best models on the newly proposed AutoAttack algorithm (Croce and Hein,
2020), which is an ensemble attack method that contains four different white-box and black-box
attacks for the best attack performances. We evaluate our trained models in Section 5.3 under
AutoAttack and report the robust accuracy in Table 3. Note that the results of other baselines are
directly obtained from the AutoAttack’s public leaderboard1.
From Table 3, we can see that our trained model with a larger robust regularization parameter
significantly improves the baseline TRADES models (both our reproduced one and their official
model on the AutoAttack leaderboard) on WideResNet. This experiment further verifies the
effectiveness of our proposed strategy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the relation between network width and adversarial robustness in adversarial
training. We showed that the model robustness is closely related to both natural accuracy and
perturbation stability. While the natural accuracy is better on wider models, the perturbation
stability actually becomes worse, leading to a possible decrease in the overall model robustness. We
also studied the origin of this problem by relating perturbation stability with local Lipschitznesss
and leveraging recent studies on neural tangent kernel to prove that larger network width leads
to worse perturbation stability. Our analyses suggest that practitioners should adopt a larger
robust regularization parameter for training wider networks. Extensive experiments verified the
effectiveness of this strategy.
1https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
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A Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma A.1 (Restatement of Lemma 4.2). For any given input x ∈ Rd and `2 norm perturbation
limit , if m ≥ max(d,Ω(H log(H))), R√
m
+  ≤ c
H6(logm)3
for some sufficient small c, then with
probability at least 1−O(H)e−Ω(m(R/
√
m+)2/3H), we have for any x′ ∈ B(x, ) and Lipschitz loss L,
the input gradient norm satisfies
‖∇L(f(x′), y)‖2 = O
(√
mH
)
.
Proof. The major part of this proof is inspired from Gao et al. (2019). Let D(h)(W,x) =
diag(1{W(h)σ(· · ·σ(W(1)x)) > 0}) be a diagonal sign matrix. Then the neural network func-
tion can be rewritten as follows:
f(x) = a>D(H)(W,x)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x)W(1)x.
By the chain rule of the derivatives, the input gradient norm can be further written as
‖∇L(f(x′), y)‖2 = ‖L′(f(x′), y) · ∇f(x′)‖2
≤ ‖L′(f(x′), y)‖2 · ‖∇f(x′)‖2
= ‖L′(f(x′), y)‖2 · ‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1)‖2. (A.1)
Now let us focus on the term ‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1)‖2. Note that by triangle
inequality,
‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1)‖2
≤ ‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1) − a>D(H)(W0,x)W(H)0 · · ·D(1)(W0,x)W(1)0 ‖2
+ ‖a>D(H)(W0,x)W(H)0 · · ·D(1)(W0,x)W(1)0 ‖2. (A.2)
Note that W is updated via projected gradient descent with projection set B(R). Therefore, by
Equation (12) in Lemma A.5 of Gao et al. (2019) we have
‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1) − a>D(H)(W0,x)W(H)0 · · ·D(1)(W0,x)W(1)0 ‖2
= O
(( R√
m
+ 
)1/3
H2
√
m logm
)
, (A.3)
and by Lemma A.3 in Gao et al. (2019) we have
‖a>D(H)(W0,x)W(H)0 · · ·D(1)(W0,x)W(1)0 ‖2 = O(
√
mH). (A.4)
Combining (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), when R√
m
+  ≤ c
H6(logm)3
, we have
‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1)‖2 = O(
√
mH). (A.5)
By substituting (A.5) into (A.1) we have,
‖∇L(f(x′), y)‖2 ≤ ‖L′(f(x′), y)‖2 · ‖a>D(H)(W,x′)W(H) · · ·D(1)(W,x′)W(1)‖2 = O(
√
mH),
where the last inequality holds since ‖L′(f(x′), y)‖2 = O(1) due to the Lipschitz condition of loss L.
This concludes the proof.
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B The Experimental Detail for Reproducibility
All experiments are conducted on a single NVIDIA TITAN RTX that has a memory size of 24190MB.
It runs on the GNU Linux Debian 4.9 operating system. The experiment is implemented via PyTorch
1.2.0. We adopt the public released codes of TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) and adapt it for our own
settings, including inspecting the loss value of robust regularization and the local Lipschitzness.
CIFAR100 contains 50k images for 100 classes, which means that it has much fewer images for
each class compared with CIFAR10. This makes the learning problem of CIFAR100 much harder.
For DenseNet architecture, we adopt the 40 layers model with the bottleneck design, which is the
DenseNet-BC-40. It has three building blocks, with each one having the same number of layers.
This is the same architecture tested in the original paper of DenseNet for CIFAR10. For simplicity
reason, we make the training schedule stay the same with the one used for WideResNet, which
is the decay learning rate schedule. As DenseNet gets deeper, its channel number (width) will
be multiplied with the growing rate k. Thus, as k gets larger, the width of DenseNet also does.
Although this mechanism slightly differs from the widen factor of WideResNet, which amplify all
layers with the same ratio.
To demonstrate the fact that the over-fitting problem all comes from perturbation stability in
Section 3.2(3), we use the training schedule of the original work for Figure 2. Aside from that, all
the other experiments and plots are results under our proposed learning rate schedule, which halve
the learning rate for every epochs after the 75-th epoch and can prevent over-fitting.
C Boosting generalized adversarial training
Note that the original adversarial training method (Madry et al., 2018) does not consider the balance
of natural generalization and robust regularization. That is also the main reason we instead choose
to use TRADES(Zhang et al., 2019) model to test the boosting robust regularization strategy in
Section 5. Yet, in our stated generalized adversarial training framework (1.1), it is also possible to
boost the robust regularization for original (generalized) adversarial training. In this section, we
intend to verify that our experimental observations in Section 5 also applies to original (generalized)
adversarial training.
Note that for TRADES, the KL-divergence term, by its definition, is guaranteed to be non-
negative. For generalized adversarial training, the robust regularization term in (1.1) is also
guaranteed to be non-negative because of the max operation in theory, however, when we approximate
this maximization with projected gradient descent, it might fail to find a good x̂. We conduct
analytical experiments and find this exception has a very little chance to happen (but still could
happen), most likely at the beginning of the training procedure. To avoid this problem, we manually
set the robust regularization term in (1.1) to be non-negative by clipping the L(θ; x̂, y)− L(θ;x, y)
term. Let us denote x′ as the empirical maximization solution, the final loss function becomes:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D
{
L(θ;x, y) + λ ·max (L(θ;x′, y)− L(θ;x, y), 0)}. (C.1)
Table 4 shows the experimental results for boosting the robust regularization parameter for
generalized adversarial training models. We can observe that the boosting strategy still works in
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this generalized adversarial training method, and the larger λ indeed leads to better robust accuracy
in the final result.
Table 4: The robust accuracy, the natural accuracy and the smooth accuracy under PGD20∗0.007
attack with different λ.
Arob(%) Anat(%) Asmth(%)
λ width-1 width-5 width-10 width-1 width-5 width-10 width-1 width-5 width-10
1.00 48.12 51.96 51.59 78.08 85.64 86.86 65.78 63.58 62.36
1.25 49.53 53.14 51.87 73.23 84.26 85.97 71.85 65.88 63.19
1.50 48.88 54.44 52.87 71.77 84.14 85.70 72.08 67.09 64.37
1.75 47.83 54.74 54.08 70.30 83.28 85.11 72.28 68.24 66.14
2.00 47.70 53.24 54.75 69.29 82.23 84.23 73.55 67.19 67.58
References
Alayrac, J., Uesato, J., Huang, P., Fawzi, A., Stanforth, R. and Kohli, P. (2019). Are
labels required for improving adversarial robustness? In NeurIPS.
Allen-Zhu, Z., Li, Y. and Song, Z. (2019). A convergence theory for deep learning via over-
parameterization. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR.
Athalye, A., Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. (2018). Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. In ICML, vol. 80 of Proceedings of
Machine Learning Research. PMLR.
Bubeck, S., Lee, Y. T., Price, E. and Razenshteyn, I. P. (2019). Adversarial examples
from computational constraints. In ICML, vol. 97 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.
PMLR.
Cao, Y. and Gu, Q. (2019). Generalization bounds of stochastic gradient descent for wide and
deep neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. (2017). Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks.
In SP. IEEE Computer Society.
Carmon, Y., Raghunathan, A., Schmidt, L., Duchi, J. C. and Liang, P. (2019). Unlabeled
data improves adversarial robustness. In NeurIPS.
Chen, J. and Gu, Q. (2020). Rays: A ray searching method for hard-label adversarial attack. In
Proceedings of the 26rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining.
Chen, J., Zhou, D., Yi, J. and Gu, Q. (2020). A frank-wolfe framework for efficient and effective
adversarial attacks. In AAAI.
15
Chen, P., Zhang, H., Sharma, Y., Yi, J. and Hsieh, C. (2017). ZOO: zeroth order optimiza-
tion based black-box attacks to deep neural networks without training substitute models. In
AISec@CCS. ACM.
Cisse´, M., Bojanowski, P., Grave, E., Dauphin, Y. N. and Usunier, N. (2017). Parseval
networks: Improving robustness to adversarial examples. In ICML, vol. 70 of Proceedings of
Machine Learning Research. PMLR.
Cohen, J. M., Rosenfeld, E. and Kolter, J. Z. (2019). Certified adversarial robustness via
randomized smoothing. In ICML, vol. 97 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research. PMLR.
Croce, F. and Hein, M. (2020). Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of
diverse parameter-free attacks. In ICML.
Dhillon, G. S., Azizzadenesheli, K., Lipton, Z. C., Bernstein, J., Kossaifi, J., Khanna,
A. and Anandkumar, A. (2018). Stochastic activation pruning for robust adversarial defense.
ICLR .
Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O. and Frossard, P. (2018). Analysis of classifiers’ robustness to adversarial
perturbations. Mach. Learn. 107 481–508.
Gao, R., Cai, T., Li, H., Hsieh, C.-J., Wang, L. and Lee, J. D. (2019). Convergence of
adversarial training in overparametrized neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems.
Gilmer, J., Metz, L., Faghri, F., Schoenholz, S. S., Raghu, M., Wattenberg, M. and
Goodfellow, I. (2018). Adversarial spheres. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02774 .
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J. and Szegedy, C. (2015). Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. In ICLR (Y. Bengio and Y. LeCun, eds.).
Gu, S. and Rigazio, L. (2015). Towards deep neural network architectures robust to adversarial
examples. In ICLR (Y. Bengio and Y. LeCun, eds.).
Guo, C., Rana, M., Cisse, M. and Van Der Maaten, L. (2018). Countering adversarial images
using input transformations. ICLR .
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S. and Sun, J. (2016). Identity mappings in deep residual networks. In
ECCV.
Hein, M. and Andriushchenko, M. (2017). Formal guarantees on the robustness of a classifier
against adversarial manipulation. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems.
Hendrycks, D., Lee, K. and Mazeika, M. (2019). Using pre-training can improve model
robustness and uncertainty. In ICML, vol. 97 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.
PMLR.
Huang, G., Liu, Z., van der Maaten, L. and Weinberger, K. Q. (2017). Densely connected
convolutional networks. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition.
16
Ilyas, A., Engstrom, L., Athalye, A., Lin, J., Athalye, A., Engstrom, L., Ilyas, A.
and Kwok, K. (2018). Black-box adversarial attacks with limited queries and information. In
Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning.
Ilyas, A., Engstrom, L. and Madry, A. (2019a). Prior convictions: Black-box adversarial
attacks with bandits and priors. ICLR .
Ilyas, A., Santurkar, S., Tsipras, D., Engstrom, L., Tran, B. and Madry, A. (2019b).
Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features. In NeurIPS.
Jacobsen, J., Behrmann, J., Zemel, R. S. and Bethge, M. (2019). Excessive invariance causes
adversarial vulnerability. In ICLR. OpenReview.net.
Jacot, A., Hongler, C. and Gabriel, F. (2018). Neural tangent kernel: Convergence and
generalization in neural networks. In NeurIPS.
Krizhevsky, A., Hinton, G. et al. (2009). Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images
.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J. and Bengio, S. (2017). Adversarial machine learning at scale.
In ICLR. OpenReview.net.
Le´cuyer, M., Atlidakis, V., Geambasu, R., Hsu, D. and Jana, S. (2019). Certified robustness
to adversarial examples with differential privacy. In SP. IEEE.
Liao, F., Liang, M., Dong, Y., Pang, T., Hu, X. and Zhu, J. (2018). Defense against adversarial
attacks using high-level representation guided denoiser. In CVPR.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D. and Vladu, A. (2018). Towards deep
learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. In ICLR. OpenReview.net.
Meng, D. and Chen, H. (2017). Magnet: a two-pronged defense against adversarial examples. In
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S., Fawzi, A. and Frossard, P. (2016). Deepfool: A simple and accurate
method to fool deep neural networks. In CVPR. IEEE Computer Society.
Najafi, A., Maeda, S., Koyama, M. and Miyato, T. (2019). Robustness to adversarial
perturbations in learning from incomplete data. In NeurIPS.
Nakkiran, P. (2019). Adversarial robustness may be at odds with simplicity. CoRR
abs/1901.00532.
Pang, T., Yang, X., Dong, Y., Xu, K., Su, H. and Zhu, J. (2020). Boosting adversarial training
with hypersphere embedding. CoRR abs/2002.08619.
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P. D., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z. B. and Swami, A.
(2016a). The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. In EuroS&P. IEEE.
17
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P. D., Wu, X., Jha, S. and Swami, A. (2016b). Distillation as
a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In SP. IEEE Computer
Society.
Paulavicˇius, R. and Zˇilinskas, J. (2006). Analysis of different norms and corresponding lipschitz
constants for global optimization. Technological and Economic Development of Economy 12
301–306.
Qin, C., Martens, J., Gowal, S., Krishnan, D., Dvijotham, K., Fawzi, A., De, S.,
Stanforth, R. and Kohli, P. (2019). Adversarial robustness through local linearization. In
NeurIPS.
Raghunathan, A., Xie, S. M., Yang, F., Duchi, J. C. and Liang, P. (2019). Adversarial
training can hurt generalization. CoRR abs/1906.06032.
Rice, L., Wong, E. and Kolter, J. Z. (2020). Overfitting in adversarially robust deep learning.
CoRR abs/2002.11569.
Ross, A. S. and Doshi-Velez, F. (2018). Improving the adversarial robustness and interpretability
of deep neural networks by regularizing their input gradients. In AAAI.
Salman, H., Li, J., Razenshteyn, I. P., Zhang, P., Zhang, H., Bubeck, S. and Yang, G.
(2019). Provably robust deep learning via adversarially trained smoothed classifiers. In NeurIPS.
Samangouei, P., Kabkab, M. and Chellappa, R. (2018). Defense-gan: Protecting classifiers
against adversarial attacks using generative models. ICLR .
Schmidt, L., Santurkar, S., Tsipras, D., Talwar, K. and Madry, A. (2018). Adversarially
robust generalization requires more data. In NeurIPS.
Sehwag, V., Wang, S., Mittal, P. and Jana, S. (2020). On pruning adversarially robust neural
networks. CoRR abs/2002.10509.
Song, Y., Kim, T., Nowozin, S., Ermon, S. and Kushman, N. (2018). Pixeldefend: Leveraging
generative models to understand and defend against adversarial examples. ICLR .
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I. J. and
Fergus, R. (2014). Intriguing properties of neural networks. In ICLR (Y. Bengio and Y. LeCun,
eds.).
Trame`r, F., Papernot, N., Goodfellow, I. J., Boneh, D. and McDaniel, P. D. (2017).
The space of transferable adversarial examples. CoRR abs/1704.03453.
Tsipras, D., Santurkar, S., Engstrom, L., Turner, A. and Madry, A. (2019). Robustness
may be at odds with accuracy. In ICLR. OpenReview.net.
Wang, Y., Ma, X., Bailey, J., Yi, J., Zhou, B. and Gu, Q. (2019). On the convergence and
robustness of adversarial training. In ICML.
18
Wang, Y., Zou, D., Yi, J., Bailey, J., Ma, X. and Gu, Q. (2020). Improving adversarial
robustness requires revisiting misclassified examples. In ICLR. OpenReview.net.
Weng, T.-W., Zhang, H., Chen, P.-Y., Yi, J., Su, D., Gao, Y., Hsieh, C.-J. and Daniel,
L. (2018). Evaluating the robustness of neural networks: An extreme value theory approach. In
International Conference on Learning Representations.
Wong, E., Rice, L. and Kolter, J. Z. (2020). Fast is better than free: Revisiting adversarial
training. CoRR abs/2001.03994.
Xie, C., Wang, J., Zhang, Z., Ren, Z. and Yuille, A. (2018). Mitigating adversarial effects
through randomization. ICLR .
Zagoruyko, S. and Komodakis, N. (2016). Wide residual networks. In BMVC. BMVA Press.
Zhang, H., Yu, Y., Jiao, J., Xing, E. P., Ghaoui, L. E. and Jordan, M. I. (2019). Theoretically
principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. In ICML, vol. 97 of Proceedings of Machine
Learning Research. PMLR.
Zhang, J., Xu, X., Han, B., Niu, G., Cui, L., Sugiyama, M. and Kankanhalli, M. S. (2020a).
Attacks which do not kill training make adversarial learning stronger. CoRR abs/2002.11242.
Zhang, X., Chen, J., Gu, Q. and Evans, D. (2020b). Understanding the intrinsic robustness of
image distributions using conditional generative models. In Proceedings of the 23rd International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics.
Zou, D., Cao, Y., Zhou, D. and Gu, Q. (2020). Gradient descent optimizes over-parameterized
deep relu networks. Machine Learning 109 467–492.
19
